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Criminal use of cryptocurrencies – a great new threat or is cash still 
king? 
In July 2018, the Federal Reserve Chairman told the US Congress that 
cryptocurrencies are ‘great’ for money laundering. Many media headlines 
follow comments such as this, suggesting that cryptocurrencies are a significant 
criminal tool that should be feared. 
This article examines academic research, particularly those that analysed the 
Bitcoin blockchain, to see if the results matched the headlines. This was then 
compared to wider government and think-tank reporting. Contrary to popular 
opinion, this article shows that cryptocurrencies are currently used in a very 
small percentage of crime and they are not the great future threat that many 
assert. 
Cash is the real enemy for crime fighting and remains ‘king’. It is anonymous2 
and far more useful to criminals than cryptocurrencies. However, the future of 
money is uncertain and policy makers need to understand that there is more to 
the debate about cryptocurrencies than the headlines suggest. 
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cryptocurrencies, bitcoin 
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Introduction 
The history of money is an intriguing subject, and we are very much in the middle of 
the story. Money is central to the workings of our planet and core to issues of politics 
and security. It is against this backdrop that we have witnessed the emergence of 
cryptocurrencies.3 They enjoy fervent support amongst those that embrace their 
cypherpunk roots, who believe in them as a new financial system, free from control by 
traditional actors. But there have been others who have denounced them as a scam or 
criminal tool, remarks which are often reported by the media. Jamie Dimon, for 
example, the CEO of JP Morgan Chase, has gone as far as publicly calling anyone who 
buys bitcoin4 as stupid and he has labelled it a fraud (Son, Levitt, and Louis 2017). In 
July 2018, Jerome Powell, the chairman of the US Federal Reserve, is reported to have 
said in evidence to the US Congress that ‘cryptocurrencies are great if you are trying to 
hide or launder money’ (Shi 2018). This criminal association has made many headlines 
over the years, such as this: 
 
FBI fears Bitcoin’s popularity with criminals. (Zetter 2012) 
 
More recently, the issue has received even more attention after Facebook announced 





House, The New York Times published this headline, quoting the US Treasury 
Secretary: 
 
Cryptocurrencies Pose National Security Threat, Mnuchin Says. (Rappeport and 
Popper 2019) 
 
This article will examine the use of cryptocurrencies in cybercrime. Are the 
headlines accurate and should policy makers and politicians prioritise this technology 
in their fight against crime? It is important to note, however, that usage should not be 
conflated with the future potential threat of cryptocurrencies. These pillars of the 
debate need to be considered in separation, but alongside each other – failure to do so 
leads to a confused view of the issue and the potential to focus on the wrong priorities 
in fighting crime. The future is difficult to predict, but this article will consider the 
threat that cryptocurrencies could one day pose and show that there is less to fear than 
the headlines currently suggest. 
 
Money 
To thoroughly explore the use of cryptocurrencies in crime, they should be considered 
as part of the bigger picture of man’s use of money, as we enter an ever more digital 
world. It is important to understand why they have emerged and where they fit into the 
wider world of money. Cash, as the physical equivalent of a cryptocurrency, will also 
be given some consideration as it will serve as a comparator throughout much of this 
article. 
 
A brief history 
The value of metal to man can be traced all the way back to our emergence from the 
Stone Age (Davies 2002). Coinage developed several hundred years BC (63) and was 
established long before our popular images of its use in Ancient Greece or in the 
Roman Empire. Paper money has also been in use for a long time – since the seventh 
century in China but somewhat later in the UK having been first issued by the Bank of 
England as late as the seventeenth century (Fish and Whymark 2015, 219). It is only in 
the twentieth century that we saw significant change in how we spend; credit cards, 
debit cards and automated electronic payments all arrived. So, too, did the internet and 
the subsequent boom in e-commerce. The technological advancements have only 
gathered pace – mobile phones are in most people’s pockets, along with banking and 
other apps. Indeed, 71 per cent of the world’s population, or 5.9 billion, are forecast to 
be mobile subscribers by 2025 (Global System for Mobile communications 
Association 2018). 
 
 To understand our modern-day use of money we should first look back to the 
end of the Second World War. At that time, there was a growing recognition that the 
international monetary system needed attention and that failures in this area in the 
inter-war period were at least in part to blame for political tensions in the world. The 
Bretton Woods system emerged in 1944 and key amongst its features were the tying of 
currencies to gold and the establishment of the International Monetary Fund. The 
system fared well for a time but came to an end not long after the Nixon Shock of 
1971, when the United States suspended the link of the dollar to gold. This brought 
about the end of representative money and ushered in the era of fiat money, which 
continues to the present day. Representative money has a claim on a commodity such 





other forms of money that are linked to commodities of real value. The Bank of 
England describes fiat as ‘money that is not convertible to gold or any other asset’ 
(2019) – for example, a paper banknote. 
 
The implications of supply and demand in fiat currencies is an ongoing 
economic debate. Fiat money is backed by the government that issues it, often via a 
central bank. As such, governments can expand the supply of their currency with only 
self-imposed restriction. To some, this is seen as an advantage over the limitations of a 
gold standard, enabling the central bank to ‘smooth the functioning of the economy’ 
(Bank of England 2019). To others though, the result is potential for greater currency 
devaluation - the US dollar lost 87 per cent of its purchasing power between 1957 and 
2008 (Ferguson 2008, 63). Austrian economists argue that fiat currencies lead to high 
inflation and, ultimately, crisis (Polleit 2012). 
 
International settlement 
Modern times have also been shaped by the dominance of the dollar as the 
international settlement currency. Not only is it the domestic currency of the largest 
economy in the world, but it has also become the dominant currency of international 
trade and even the reserve currency of the world, accounting for 70 per cent of foreign 
exchange reserve assets stored by central banks across the globe (usually in the form of 
bonds) (Martin, Mukhopadhyay, and van Hombeeck 2017).  
 
This is relevant to the discussion of currencies due to the Triffin Dilemma, 
which describes the conflict that arises when a national currency is also used as an 
international reserve currency. As global trade rises, more dollars are demanded 
internationally, requiring ‘persistent deficits in the U.S. balance of payments’ – this 
jeopardises the dollar’s value, which is what the system itself is based on (Boughton 
2001, 926-927). Indeed, after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 the Governor of 
the People’s Bank of China called for reform to the international monetary system: 
 
The desirable goal of reforming the international monetary system, therefore, is to 
create an international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations 
and is able to remain stable in the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies 
caused by using credit-based national currencies. (Xiaochuan 2009)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
  
This is something that John Maynard Keynes had proposed at the Bretton Woods 
Conference in the 1940s with his supranational Bancor currency – but it was rejected. 
The Chinese encouraged the IMF to promote and widen the use of their special 
drawing rights (SDRs), a unit of account basket of five major currencies (International 
Monetary Fund 2019), but almost ten years later in 2017 the Governor of the People’s 
Bank of China was still calling for further reform and expanded use of SDRs 
(Xiaochuan 2017). The dollar, to this day, retains its dominance on the international 
stage, but the world is not settled on this position - recent trade escalations and the 
threat of a currency war between the US and China exemplify this tension (Brown 
2019).  
 
Cash – notes and coins 
It is necessary to understand our current financial system, its limitations and attitudes 
towards it if we are to critically analyse where cryptocurrencies fit in and why. At 
higher levels, there is discord about the mechanisms of international finance and, at 





trend, though, demand for cash has grown. This phenomenon deserves some further 
examination, as, according to one former IMF economist and now Harvard Professor: 
 
Cash plays a starring role in a broad range of criminal activities, including drug 
trafficking, racketeering, extortion, corruption of public officials, human trafficking 
and, of course, money laundering. (Rogoff 2016, 2) 
 
In the UK, as an example, the demand for banknotes has outstripped GDP for 
several decades, with the total value of Notes In Circulation (NIC) doubling to 
approximately £70 billion between 2005 and 2017 alone (Cleland 2018). Paradoxically 
though, whilst NIC has grown, late 2017 marked the year that debit card transactions 
overtook cash in the UK (which continued its decline by another 15%) (UK Finance 
2018). So why has demand for notes doubled whilst use of cash continues to decline, 
especially given its use in criminal activity? A Bank of England bulletin suggests that 
no more than half of the NIC are used domestically for transactions or hoarding – with 
the rest overseas or used in the shadow economy (Fish and Whymark 2015, 32). The 
shadow economy consists of legal and illegal activities that attempt to ‘avoid 
government regulation, taxation or observation’ (223-224). The size of these markets 
cannot be accurately given, due to the ‘untraceable nature of cash’ (216). This is a 
concern, as we do not know how much cash is used for crime. A Europol strategic 
report on the use of cash by criminals reaches the same conclusion: 
 
…perhaps the most significant finding around cash is that there is insufficient 
information around its use, both for legitimate and illicit purposes. (Europol 2015) 
 
It may be surprising that a leading law enforcement agency does not know the 
extent to which cash is used for criminal activity but it is the nature of cash (which will 
be explored in the next section) that makes it hard to know what it is used for. Central 
banks have a detailed grasp on how much cash is in circulation, but they ‘simply do 
not know’ who is holding it (Rogoff 2016, 32). In all, we are left with an intriguing 
situation: cash usage is falling and has been overtaken by debit card transactions, but 
demand for cash has doubled even as we move towards more digital payments. If a 
minority percentage of cash use is for actual transactions, then the Europol conclusion 
is alarming. The extent to which cash is an enabler of crime appears to be an under-
researched and under-appreciated situation. 
 
Cash – and crime 
Given that both the Bank of England and Europol acknowledge that the extent of 
criminal use of cash is not known, what can be said of its use for that purpose? 
Reporting indicates that ‘cash is still king’ when it comes to criminal financing 
(Europol 2015; Rogoff 2016, 67). Furthermore, according to a UK national risk 
assessment on money laundering and terrorist financing, cash remains one of the main 
methods employed and the report also notes that ‘a significant amount of criminal 
activity in the UK generates its proceeds in cash’ (HM Treasury and Home Office 
2017, 5-6, 19). Whilst we do not have reliable statistics on the use of cash by 
criminals, central banks do know how much cash they introduce into the system, as we 
have seen. Using these as starting figures, there have been attempts to produce rough 
estimates about the extent of the use of cash by criminals. In an article published by 
the American Institute for Economic Research, one estimate is that ‘more than a third 






Having established that cash remains key to criminal activities, analysis of the 
issuance of large denomination notes needs consideration. Cash, in large volumes, is 
heavy and this presents a transportation challenge to criminals. For example, £1 
million in 500 euro banknotes weighs 2kg, whilst in twenty pound notes, this would 
weigh 50kg (Casciani 2010). For many years, law enforcement has observed that large 
denomination notes are not used in ordinary transactions and are instead a useful tool 
for criminals (Europol 2015,6; Casciani 2010). The European Central Bank recognised 
this and halted production of the 500 euro note after ‘taking into account concerns that 
this banknote could facilitate illicit activities’ (European Central Bank 2016). There 
have been calls to remove a number of other large notes, including the £50 note, but 
many still remain (Sands et al. 2016). In the UK, a recent Treasury report (HM 
Treasury 2019) acknowledges that the £50 note is not used routinely for transactions, 
but it is to be kept for a number of reasons. These include that it is used as a store of 
value and that, given inflation, it may be needed in the future. 
 
One possible motivation for the continued circulation of cash is that 
governments make significant incomes from controlling the supply. It is very cheap to 
make large denomination bills and thus a profitable monopoly. For the US and the 
Eurozone, paper money earns in the region of 0.5 per cent of GDP, approximately $70 
billion for the US in 2015 and a similar figure for the EU (Rogoff 2016, 81). HM 
Treasury acknowledges that reducing cash and moving to digital transactions may 
reduce tax avoidance and money laundering, although this could be limited ‘if the 
dishonest minority continue to use cash to hide or suppress their income (HM Treasury 
2018, 15). There are likely, then, to be substantial savings by reducing or eliminating 
criminal use of cash; HMRC report that just two behaviours, evasion and the hidden 
economy, account for £8.3 billion in lost tax revenue or a little short of a quarter of the 
total tax gap (the difference between expected and received tax) (HM Revenue & 
Customs 2019, 10). It is ironic that it is governments that take clean money and dirty it 
by supplying cash to criminals – a process referred to as ‘reverse money laundering’ 
(Rogoff 2016, 4). 
 
The world is moving towards increasing digital transactions and this presents 
us with interesting times in terms of how criminals finance and conduct their 
operations. If ‘cash really is king’ for criminals, then why has there been a prevailingly 
negative narrative around cryptocurrencies? Are they currently used as extensively in 
crime as some say? And are cryptocurrencies likely to become a significant threat in 
the future should they ever achieve widespread adoption?  
 
Cryptocurrencies 
Cryptocurrencies are classified as ‘virtual assets’ by the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF). They describe virtual assets as ‘a digital representation of value… [that] do 
not include digital representations of fiat currencies’ (Financial Action Task Force 
2018, 124). This clearly separates cryptocurrencies from national currencies, including 
cash. Bitcoin, as the primary cryptocurrency, will be the focus of this article. It was the 
first cryptocurrency and is the overwhelmingly dominant network with a market 
capitalisation of $188 billion, accounting for 66 per cent of the entire marketplace of 
over 2000 cryptocurrencies5 (Coinmarketcap 2019). The threat that privacy-focussed 






The properties of cash and cryptocurrencies  
Money, of all forms, has three widely accepted functions: a medium of exchange (for 
goods, rather than bartering), a store of value (so you can buy goods later) and as a unit 
of account (to price goods so they can be compared). Cash, though, has some further 
properties. Firstly, it is anonymous (except for serial numbers). Secondly, it is a bearer 
instrument which means that whoever holds the money is the owner and there is no 
information recorded about whose it is. Thirdly, there is no mechanism implicit in cash 
itself that records transactions – that is, any recording that occurs is the result of other 
protocols, rules and laws that are introduced.  Hence we have mature anti-money 
laundering regimes and requirements such as Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs). It is 
worth noting, here, that cash use is the main reason for reporting suspicious activity in 
the EU (Europol 2015, 16). And finally, settlement is instant when using cash – when 
you give someone cash for a good the deal is done; there is no middleman when two 
people transact in the street and there is no mechanism to undo the transaction. It is 
this ‘anonymous and untraceable nature of cash’ (HM Treasury 2018, 14) that makes it 
such a convenient criminal tool. For example, it is good for money laundering as, 
compared to electronic transactions, ‘it is difficult to ascertain the source of cash and 
impossible to know the intended beneficiary’ (Europol 2015, 9). 
 
It is useful to draw out the properties of cash because cryptocurrencies are 
often described as ‘digital cash’. It is apt, as they do mimic the above properties, albeit 
with some subtle, but important distinctions. Like cash, once a cryptocurrency 
transaction has taken place, the exchange is final and there is no recourse to undo the 
transaction, and there is no third-party like a bank to go to. But cryptocurrencies do 
vary in two important ways. For a currency like bitcoin, the system is pseudonymous, 
not anonymous. It is possible to see addresses where transactions have come from and 
gone to, but no identity is linked to these addresses. (Privacy coins, however, employ 
other cryptographic techniques to overcome this pseudonymity to provide anonymity – 
a threat we will explore later). The other big difference to physical cash is that all 
Bitcoin transactions are recorded on a public blockchain. Every single movement of 
funds from one party to another is captured and recorded in a manner that prevents any 
of the data from being tampered with (save for theoretical consensus attacks, such as 
the ‘51 per cent attack’, which would require huge resources - note this attack is not 
the result of a flaw in the system but a symptom of its design) (Antonopoulos 2017, 




It was against the backdrop of the 2007-2008 financial crisis that Bitcoin emerged. In 
November 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto6 (2008) released a paper describing ‘a peer-to-peer 
electronic cash system’. Email evidence and text in the genesis block7 suggest that the 
motivation for the system was related to the financial crisis or it at least provided good 
timing for a system that did not rely on a trusted third party and was not controllable 
by governments (Carney 2018, 6-7). Yet this was not the first attempt at a digital cash 
system. Bitcoin’s roots go back to the 1980s and academic papers produced by 
cryptographers at the time and since (see, for example, Chaum 1983; Nick Szabo 
2008). There were several attempts to develop a digital monetary system in the 
subsequent decades but they never quite succeeded for one reason or another. Perhaps 
it was just a natural evolution, as each iteration provided an improvement over the 





managed to bring together all the right elements and features to produce a system that 
has not only survived, but has gained considerable traction to become a multi-billion 
dollar market that is known all over the world. 
 
There are several reasons for its success. Timing is one – as we have seen it 
came at a time of increased fiat money supply. The global financial crisis also 
provided a good argument for a system that could not be controlled by governments 
and central banks. Cryptocurrency owners can hold their coins independently in a 
‘wallet’, such as on a mobile phone. And transactions are processed by a distributed 
computation system of ‘miners’, using a ‘proof of work’ algorithm to achieve 
consensus (Antonopoulos 2017, 4). Bitcoin also has a fixed supply, a feature that 
marks it in stark contrast to fiat currencies. Whilst the US paper dollar supply has 
grown at pace to stand at $1.72 trillion in circulation as of 26 December 2018 (The 
Federal Reserve n.d.), Bitcoin has a mathematically fixed supply of 21 million coins. 
This makes it a rare deflationary system.8 
 
Another possible reason for success is that Bitcoin did not rely on the uptake of 
merchants to be useable – it had good utility from inception for peer-to-peer 
transactions. Even in this age of internet commerce, it can be slow and expensive to 
send money abroad (via a third-party bank). Bitcoin offered a fast and cheap way to 
send funds globally - 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Transactions are confirmed 
approximately every ten minutes and are considered secure to consensus attacks after 
six confirmations i.e. after one hour (Antonopoulos 2017, 255). At the time of writing 
the fee is $0.35 for a transaction in the next confirmation – however, looking at 
historic daily averages, at a time of network congestion that can rise to over $35 
(bitcoinfees.info 2019). Crucially, fees are related to the amount of data the transaction 
takes and market activity, rather than Bitcoin value (Antonopoulos 2017, 127). A 
recent Bitcoin transaction worth $468 million was sent for less than $400 in fees 
(Canellis 2019). In comparison, traditional remittance fees are related to the currency 
value and have a global average of 6.84 per cent – banks are the most expensive with 
an average price of 10.49 per cent (The World Bank 2019). In terms of speed, Barclays 
bank, for example, guarantee next day settlement for Single Euro Payments Area 
(SEPA) credit transfers, 3-4 working days for Europe and North America and within 
eight days for the rest of the world using their international payments services 
(Barclays 2019). 
 
This is not to say that Bitcoin is flawless. It struggles with demand at times due 
to only being able to process seven transactions per second, compared to 56,000 per 
second for Visa (Croman et al. 2016). There are technical proposals for scaling 
cryptocurrencies, such as the Lightning Network for Bitcoin, where transactions are 
carried out ‘off-chain’, with the ‘base-layer’ being the main blockchain (Gudgeon et al. 
2019). This method would also reduce fees. Several cryptocurrencies offer different 
design choices resulting in faster transaction confirmation and, in some cases, even 
zero fees (Williams 2018). 
 
Bitcoin has been operating for over a decade but its usefulness as money is still 
debatable. Most major companies do not accept it as a form of payment and it is not 
legal tender. This may, of course, change in time. As a form of digital money, though, 





First users and the early narrative 
Bitcoin started to regularly record over 1,000 transactions per day in 2011. Some of the 
earliest adopters of Bitcoin did so for illegal purposes; analysis from the US Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) showed that about 90 per cent of Bitcoin 
transactions in 2013 were related to criminal activity (Russo 2018). A payment 
mechanism that did not rely on a trusted third party and that could be self-enrolled 
onto (by creating your own key pair – analogous to your account) was appealing to 
criminals. So too were further properties of cheap, international payment that could not 
be reversed. It is, perhaps, no coincidence that the increase in Bitcoin transactions took 
place as illicit marketplaces gained traction on the dark net. Adding the properties of 
Bitcoin to the anonymity provided by the dark net created a working ecosystem for 
criminal behaviour on the internet. This combination proved attractive material to 
journalists and many stories about the illegal underworld and Bitcoin ensued (such as 




There are many ways that criminals could use cryptocurrencies for crime. They can 
take them as a form of payment in place of cash in the real world, or they can use the 
digital form of money to transact online. However, a recent report for the European 
Parliament (Keatinge, Carlisle, and Keen 2018) concluded that there have only been a 
small number of cases where virtual currencies have been used in connection with 
terrorist financing, for example, and that cryptocurrencies currently do not present any 
great advantage over existing methods. Where then is the criminal activity that has 
been reported?  
 
To answer questions about the extent of criminal use, we must look toward the 
dark net and to Tor hidden services. The dark net refers to areas of the internet that 
require special software or mechanisms to access them (Owen and Savage 2015, 1). 
Tor is the most famous of these and is often used synonymously with the dark net - 
even though there are others such as Freenet and I2P (Gehl 2018, 1). Tor requires 
open-source software to access it, enabling enhanced privacy on the internet by routing 
‘traffic through multiple servers and encrypt[ing] it each step of the way’ (Tor Project 
2019). As well as providing anonymous access to the internet, Tor also enables people 
to host websites anonymously – the Tor hidden services (Owen and Savage 2015, 2). 
Whilst Tor can be used for many legitimate activities (for example forums, activism or 
censorship avoidance), it can also be used for illicit purposes, such as the provision of 
dark net marketplaces for the sale of illegal goods and services. Dark nets, therefore, 
are a logical focus for the use of cryptocurrencies in crime. For the remainder of this 
article, the dark net will refer to Tor unless specified, as it hosts most marketplaces.  
 
The Tor dark net 
In 2015 researchers from the University of Portsmouth analysed traffic on Tor over a 
six month period (Owen and Savage 2015). Surprisingly, the Silk Road9 marketplace 
was only receiving a little over 8,000 requests per day. In terms of usage at least, they 
showed that the vast majority of Tor is concerned with child abuse imagery, not with 
illegal trade where the use of cryptocurrencies is most associated. 
 
The demise of the Silk Road provided further information about the extent of 





his laptop) that helps build the picture of the size of his operations. A research report 
on Tor marketplaces between 2013 and 2015 provides further interesting insight 
(Soska and Christin 2015). In 2013, their results showed the Silk Road had sales of 
$300,000 per day, projecting to over $100 million per year or sales commissions in the 
region of $1.1-1.2 million. This is consistent with the trial evidence figure for the 
lifetime of Silk Road income as $214 million. The report also states sales figures of 
$6-8 million for the Silk Road 2. Lastly, the authors report daily sales volumes of 
$300,000-500,000 for the entire Tor marketplace ecosystem, based on analysis of 35 
marketplaces operating in the four years since the Silk Road began. 
 
On first take, there appears to be some contradiction between these findings; if 
the traffic requests for the Silk Road were a very small part of Tor, can this be 
reconciled with a supposed ‘massive’ demand for drugs online (Soska and Christin 
2015, 46)? The figures give us a rough estimate of the size of Tor marketplaces at that 
time. More recent reporting also enables us to understand the scale of the issue on the 
dark net. According to the UN (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2018, 15), 
the AlphaBay marketplace had 200,000 users over its lifetime. Other researchers show 
that there are on average seventeen marketplaces available to users at any time (Foley, 
Karlsen, and Putniņš 2018, 22). This is close to the figure observed of fourteen 
operational marketplaces in a joint report by the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and Europol (2017). Using the upper figure of 
seventeen marketplaces and the AlphaBay users estimate of 200,000, gives a total 
serviceable dark net market of 3.4 million users. 
 
To determine the extent to which dark net marketplaces represent a threat, we 
must consider the wider, global drugs market. The United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime’s World Drug Report (2018) stated that 2016 saw the highest ever production of 
cocaine at 1,410 tons. Some quick calculations based on a street value of £30 per gram 
(Shapiro and Daly 2016) gives a global cocaine value in the region of $38 billion. This 
is a valuation just for cocaine production, not the entire drugs market. An EMCDDA 
report (2016) estimates the total retail value of the drugs market in the EU at a little 
over €24 billion. Furthermore, a White House report (Office of National Drug Control 
Policy 2014) looking at American drug use put consumer spending on illegal drugs in 
the US at $100 billion per year, with some 23 million Americans classed as chronic 
users10 of just four main drugs. Whilst the dark net market figures are not directly 
comparable to these numbers, they are offered to enable the reader to consider the size 
of the threat that each represents. Although there is more to consider than scale alone, 
the likes of the Silk Road, with yearly sales of around $100 million, represent a small 
but significant fraction of the problem.  
 
This conclusion begs the earlier question of why cryptocurrencies have such a 
widely associated connection with criminality. In part, it is because the strong 
properties of cryptocurrencies are as useful to criminals as they are to law-abiding 
citizens. It is logical that criminals were early adopters of a new technology that 
offered enhanced privacy, as they have a lot to hide. This resulted in the high 
percentage of criminal activity in Bitcoin usage, as reported by the DEA. These early 
figures are also from a time before Bitcoin became more widely acknowledged. In fact, 
the DEA analysis of 2018 now shows that this figure has flipped following the surge in 
awareness of Bitcoin in 2017 – 10 per cent of Bitcoin transactions are related to 





(Russo 2018). Whilst this ratio has fallen, the market has grown and so too, therefore, 
has the dollar amount of this criminal usage.  
 
More recent research by a blockchain intelligence company that monitors 
cryptocurrency transactions reports that this ratio has fallen even further - with illicit 
activity in Bitcoin at only 0.5 per cent, based on $829 million spent on the dark net. 
They compare this figure to an estimated $300 billion of proceeds of crime in the US 
in 2010, which was about 2 per cent of the overall US economy (Robinson 2019). 
There are several reasons to be careful comparing these figures. Firstly, they are far 
apart in time. Secondly, as discussed earlier, it is very hard to gather accurate 
information where the use of cash is involved. However, in terms of the threat that 
cryptocurrencies pose now, this is interesting. The ratio of criminal activity is very low 
– remember one earlier estimate that over a third of US cash is involved in tax 
avoidance and crime. Also, the scale of criminal activity in dollar terms is a much 
smaller problem than for cash. This supports the assertion here that whilst 
cryptocurrencies need to be considered for their criminal usage, this should not remove 
the focus of policymakers from the greater threat that cash poses in the present time. 
Finally, we must also repeat that usage now is a different concern to threat in the 
future, which we will come to shortly. 
 
Anonymity and money laundering 
A key criticism of cryptocurrencies, certainly in regard to their use on the dark net, is 
the anonymity that they afford. Cash is anonymous, cryptocurrencies less so. Bitcoin is 
the dominant player and, as discussed earlier, is pseudonymous. Users have an address, 
but the identity of the person using the address is not made public. That is the theory, 
but how anonymous is the system in practice? There has been significant academic 
research in this area in particular. Ron and Shamir (2013), Androulaki et al. (2013) and 
Meiklejohn et al. (2013) have shown that anonymization in Bitcoin is not as strong as 
believed. Techniques such as re-identification11 and crawling of websites to identify 
users who have displayed an address (for example, to receive a donation) are some that 
can be used. Their research shows that criminals trying to withdraw large amounts of 
funds need to use central exchange services, which is an obvious opportunity for law 
enforcement to de-anonymise thieves. They conclude that Bitcoin is not an attractive 
system for large amounts of illicit activity such as money laundering. This is in part 
because there are now several cryptocurrency intelligence companies that monitor all 
transactions on several blockchains, including Bitcoin (Cointelegraph 2017). They use 
the techniques above and analyse the transactions in order to offer services to law 
enforcement and other interested entities (Wolfson 2018). Their work gives us an 
insight into cryptocurrency transactions in a way that cannot be done with cash. 
 
Of course, this does not mean that criminals will not use Bitcoin for money 
laundering. In 2016, the founder of the Liberty Reserve digital currency service pled 
guilty to laundering over $250 million. More recently, the head of Europol is reported 
as saying that around 4 per cent of the £100 billion laundered in Europe is done using 
cryptocurrencies (The Economist 2018). Once more, we should note that this means 
that 96 per cent of this money laundering is still being conducted using traditional 
methods, including cash. The point, though, is that criminals will launder wherever 
there is opportunity and cases are seen in established finance too. In fact, penalties on 
traditional banks since the financial crisis rose to $321 billion by the end of 2016 





in traditional banks related to staggering sums of money. Again then, cryptocurrencies 
need to be kept in perspective with other methods of committing crime. 
 
A report by Elliptic (Fanusie and Robinson 2018), one such cryptocurrency 
intelligence company, looked at the flow of half a million bitcoins from 102 illicit 
entities over a four-year period from 2013 to 2016. The study did not aim to cover all 
illicit activity but it aimed to show what was done with these bitcoins in a significant 
sample. They showed that over the four years, the source of over 97 per cent of the 
illicit bitcoins was dark net marketplaces. Of note though, was that in 2016 this figure 
was around 80 per cent with ransomware taking almost a 16 per cent share. This rise 
for ransomware as a source of illicit bitcoins from zero per cent in 2013 deserves some 
further examination that we will return to later. From a money laundering perspective, 
the report revealed some other interesting results. Looking at the destination of illicit 
bitcoins, 45 per cent went to bitcoin exchanges but there were two other significant 
recipients – both gambling and mixer12 sites received an approximate share of 25 per 
cent each. This is important to note for regulation; other services receive as large a 
share of illicit bitcoins as exchanges, where fiat typically enters and exits 
cryptocurrency. We must also consider what percentage of total transactions are illicit; 
for exchanges less than 1 per cent, gambling sites 2 per cent and for mixers 16 per 
cent. Whilst not all illicit bitcoin is covered by the study, the figures do show that 
certain services require extra focus for anti-money laundering effort. 
 
It is also interesting that, in 2016, criminals were becoming dissatisfied with 
the cost and speed of Bitcoin due to increased demand on the network, rather than with 
issues of anonymity (Barysevich and Solad 2018, 1). As a result, Litecoin emerged as 
the second most accepted currency on the dark net (by 30 per cent of vendors), 
although bitcoin retained its number one position and was accepted by all dark net 
vendors (5). It is important to note that cryptocurrencies focussed on privacy were not 
enjoying wide acceptance despite growing awareness - Monero, for example, was only 
supported by 6 per cent of vendors. The conclusion is that speed and cost appear to 
matter more to criminals than anonymity. 
 
In conclusion, as long as there are criminals, there will be money laundering. 
Whether mankind is using physical cash, traditional banking or cryptocurrencies this is 
an enduring problem. The head of Europol’s £4 billion estimate puts cryptocurrency 
money laundering as an arguably greater threat than commerce on the dark net. 
However, Europol’s Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (2017) states that 
cryptocurrencies are not the biggest problem: 
 
Cash continues to play an important role when it comes to criminals realising their 
criminal gains; it has well-established methodologies for laundering, and is as readily 
exchangeable, relatively untraceable, and pseudo-anonymous – similar to the 
cryptocurrencies favoured in the digital underground. As a result, virtual currencies 
have yet to be adopted to any large degree by established money launderers who are 
likely to favour long established methodologies. (Europol EC3 2017) 
 
Criminal attitudes do not yet show a strong move towards more privacy focussed 
alternatives, so there remain opportunities for de-anonymisation certainly whilst 
bitcoin remains ubiquitous on the dark net. The threat then of cryptocurrencies in 
relation to money laundering remains relatively low when compared to cash and other 
methods. Increased regulation and lax use of cryptocurrency privacy features offer 





regulation arrives at the key nexus points of exchanges and other service providers. 
Specific services, such as gambling sites and in particular mixers, should be given 
extra attention by regulators and law enforcement due to the higher percentage of illicit 
funds they receive. 
 
Ransomware 
The Elliptic research in the previous section presented an interesting anomaly. Whilst 
dark net marketplaces are the source of the majority of illicit bitcoin, in 2016 there was 
a leap in ransomware as the source. This deserves some further attention to better 
understand the part that cryptocurrencies play in these attacks. 
 
In a study of most of the ransomware seen between 2006 and 2014, only 2.86 
per cent used Bitcoin as a ransom method, with 10 per cent using premium numbers 
and the majority, at a little over 88 per cent, using prepaid online services such as 
Paysafecard (Kharraz et al. 2015). Using a system such as Paysafecard, the attacker 
receives vouchers from the victim which can then be sold elsewhere. More recent 
research (Paquet-Clouston, Haslhofer, and Dupont 2018), however, comments that 
nearly all the ransomware families observed used bitcoin for payment, suggesting that 
this is now a preferred method. Research is needed to understand whether an improved 
payment method results in an increase in volume of this crime type. Similarly, do 
cryptocurrencies offer an improvement to other traditional crimes, such as in a case of 
real-world kidnap where a cryptocurrency ransom was claimed instead of cash (Libell 
and Martyn-Hemphill 2019)? Policy makers should consider, though, that ransomware 
can operate without cryptocurrencies. Other forms of digital value exist, which 
criminals will use should cryptocurrencies no longer be available. 
 
Another point to consider is the amount of money that ransomware raises for 
the perpetrators. Using the example of CryptoLocker, a notable ransomware that had a 
large impact, we can see that it raised 1,226 bitcoin as of 15 December 2013 
(Spagnuolo, Maggi, and Zanero 2014). Using the price of bitcoin on that date13 gives 
an approximate value of bitcoin raised of $1 million. Further research provides an 
estimate of the total value raised from ransomware, between 2013 to mid-2017, at 
nearly $13 million (Paquet-Clouston, Haslhofer, and Dupont 2018). Whilst 
cryptocurrency value is extremely volatile, which impacts usefulness as a medium of 
exchange, an attacker may gain further if the assets are held and they appreciate. 
However, these amounts are modest in relation to the global sums of criminal activity 
seen so far. It must be stressed that whilst the ransom secured may be unexceptional, 
the wider impact that these attacks have is huge - WannaCry, for example, is estimated 
to have incurred a wider cost of $4 billion (Berr 2017), perhaps explaining why 
Europol has commented that ‘ransomware attacks have eclipsed most other global 
cybercrime threats’ (Europol EC3 2017, 10). The point to be made is that ransomware 
does not raise huge amounts of money and so is not a major financer of crime groups. 
This does not trivialise all the other significant impacts that ransomware causes. 
 
The final point to consider in relation to cryptocurrencies and ransomware is 
the political dimension that these attacks can have. Two of the most recent and high-
profile ransomware attacks of all-time, WannaCry and NotPetya, occurred in 2017 and 
impacted the United Kingdom as well as many other countries. WannaCry is 
memorable in the UK for the disruption that it caused to the NHS. WannaCry was 
associated with only six bitcoin addresses and approximately $100,000 of bitcoin; 





(Paquet-Clouston, Haslhofer, and Dupont 2018, 7). These numbers are particularly low 
and of even more interest when we consider that the US Computer Emergency 
Response Team (US-CERT) released a malware analysis report of NotPetya and 
summarised that the design did not appear to make it possible for the attackers to 
decrypt a victim’s files even if they paid a ransom (US-CERT 2017). In both cases, the 
UK publicly attributed the attacks to state actors; in the case of WannaCry to the North 
Korean Lazarus Group, citing sanctions avoidance (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
and Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon 2017) and for NotPetya the blame was placed on the 
Russian Government, where the attack ‘masqueraded as a criminal enterprise but 
its…primary targets were Ukrainian’ (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, National 
Cyber Security Centre, and Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon 2018). 
 
These last two attacks show the political dimension that ransomware can have. 
As such, policy makers should recognise that the role cryptocurrencies played in them 
was marginal, with other issues at play. In the case of NotPetya, the use of 
cryptocurrencies was incidental – the motive for the attack was political. Observers 
should not conflate the severe impact that ransomware can have with the part that 
cryptocurrencies play in them. As discussed, if cryptocurrencies did not exist then 
attacks like NotPetya or WannaCry could still continue, either with an alternative 
payment method or without one at all. 
 
Future threat 
This article has focussed so far on criminal use of cryptocurrencies from two 
perspectives: absolute scale of crime and criminal activity as a percentage of total 
activity. There will be no attempt to predict these figures in terms of future threat, as 
the world of cryptocurrencies is volatile and unpredictable. However, there are several 
key areas to consider in terms of the future threat that cryptocurrencies pose. 
 
The world is becoming increasingly cashless; in the UK online transactions 
have overtaken cash and there are several parts of the world that are moving towards 
cashless societies – Sweden and China being two that are widely reported (Alderman 
2018; Yang 2018). Whilst there are concerns about the decline of cash, including use 
by the elderly and vulnerable, the trend is clear (HM Treasury 2019, 2). Should we 
reach the point that cash usage becomes minimal, or even obsolete, how does that 
change the analysis of this article? 
 
Firstly, if cryptocurrencies are a scam, do not function as money and cannot 
compete with fiat currency, then there is little chance that they will ever become a 
significant part of global finance. As the US Treasury Secretary recently said, ‘I won’t 
be talking about Bitcoin in ten years, I can assure you of that’ (Isige 2019). If this is 
the case, then we need not spend much time debating them as they will fade away in 
time. However, the world is in a very unsettled period in terms of the forms of money 
available and our usage of them, as described in this article. We are in a period of 
‘increasing monetary pluralism’ – there is more choice now in how we transact than 
ever before (Dodd 2017, 36). It is presumptuous to rule out any one form. 
 
The mix of options is still evolving. The rise of cryptocurrencies has prompted 
central banks, including the Bank of England, to consider whether they should provide 
central bank digital currency (CBDC) (Carney 2018, 11). Indeed, the People’s Bank of 
China is reportedly close to launching such a currency (Huang 2019). We have also 





Libra, in early 2020 (Libra Association Members 2019). These plans have been met 
with ‘serious concerns’ (Rappeport and Popper 2019) and Facebook’s head of 
blockchain projects faced further scepticism in recent evidence to the US Senate 
Banking Committee (Brandom 2019). The fate, then, for cryptocurrencies is at best 
uncertain and as much a societal issue as anything else, which threatens to become 
ever more geopolitical as the future of money unfolds. At the heart of the debate, 
though, is the issue of the disintermediation of banks and the state from money - 
Facebook does not aim to do either, Bitcoin does both (Dodd 2017, 37). Whilst 
Facebook has stated they will not launch the Libra without regulatory approval (Lee 
2019), Bitcoin has already been operational for over ten years. Regulation is, therefore, 
another key area to consider for the future of cryptocurrencies. 
 
The FATF Recommendations require that countries should regulate virtual 
asset service providers (VASP) (Financial Action Task Force 2018, 15). This means 
that all VASPs, including key nexus points for cryptocurrency activities like 
exchanges, are subject to the same rules and standards of other financial institutions. 
The EU’s 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (5AMLD) will also need to be 
amended into national law by January 2020 and amongst its aims is preventing risk 
from cryptocurrencies by extending to them Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and 
Counter Terrorism Financing (CTF) rules (European Commission 2018). Furthermore, 
below these levels of intergovernmental and supranational regulation are the array of 
approaches at a national level (Blandin et al. 2019). Some countries, such as China, 
have banned certain activities whilst in the UK a ‘Cryptoassets Taskforce’ was 
established to develop a response to this new technology (HM Treasury, Financial 
Conduct Authority, and Bank of England 2018). As the regulatory environment 
tightens, the ease of criminal activity reduces; for example, through identity being 
required to use services. 
 
 If a share of untraceable cash transactions moves to a digital form this may be 
an improvement from a law enforcement perspective, as commented on by the DEA: 
 
The blockchain actually gives us a lot of tools to be able to identify people…I actually 
want [criminals] to keep using them. (Russo 2018)  
 
Ironically though, this could see an increase in crime and a change in crime figures, as 
cash is reduced (Business Insider 2018). In Sweden for example, over a recent ten-year 
period, reported fraud crime has tripled (The Swedish National Council for Crime 
Prevention (Bra) 2019). Policy makers should note that a reduction in cash usage 
would see criminal behaviour change and adapt, resulting in increases in different 
types of crime. 
 
The final area to consider in terms of the future threat of cryptocurrencies is 
privacy focussed coins. We saw earlier that criminals had become frustrated by the 
fees and speed of Bitcoin during heavy demand but this did not lead to a significant 
shift to privacy coins, which aim to be more anonymous than Bitcoin. What if this shift 
does occur? Are privacy coins as ‘anonymous and untraceable’ as cash? There is a 
growing body of academic literature examining these coins, which shows that they too 
are vulnerable to de-anonymisation. Kappos et al. showed that most users of Zcash did 
not even use its main anonymity features, whilst those that do use them do it in a way 
that is identifiable and reduces anonymity for other users (2018, 475). Research into 





et al. 2017); further weaknesses are also shown in a separate study (Moser et al. 2018). 
As with all technologies, if they are not implemented or used correctly then there is a 
risk it does not achieve its aims. A criminal must also bear in mind that should a flaw 
emerge in a privacy coin at a later date, this may suddenly enable the identity of 
historic transactions to be revealed. These flaws are fixed over time, improving these 
coins but future risks remain. Considering these issues, even privacy coins are unlikely 
to be preferred to cash, which remains more useful as an anonymous and untraceable 
tool. If you also factor in the impact that improved regulations are having, then there 
will continue to be significant risk in the use of privacy coins. Whether these coins 
should be an accepted currency is also a societal question regarding privacy, as an 
extension of the same unresolved debates that exist over the use of cryptography for 
confidentiality purposes (see, for example, Moore and Rid 2016). Perhaps Bitcoin, as a 
pseudonymous system, provides a more acceptable balance between privacy and 
traceability that is better suited to society than a truly anonymous privacy coin – this is 
a tough issue for policy makers to ponder. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are used for crime. But this is 
true for all forms of money, none more so than physical cash. Cash remains king for 
criminals and if the world wants to scrutinise money in criminal activities then this is 
where the focus should be. The overall scale of criminal use of cryptocurrencies is 
small when compared to cash, and the percentage of criminal transactions is low and 
reducing. Most use is speculative rather than criminal. There are future threats to 
consider regarding cryptocurrencies; in particular the issue of privacy coins. But these 
coins arguably bring more risk to the user than cash and their use is as much a societal 
question of privacy as it is of crime. As we move towards cashless societies, usage of 
cash for transactions is falling - yet its role in criminal activities continues to be 
pivotal. For law enforcement, there may well be benefits in moving anonymous, 
untraceable cash transactions to a digital form. Cash is the greatest facilitator of crime, 
not cryptocurrencies, and is likely to remain so as long as it exists. 
 
If we arrive at a future without physical cash, what do we want this to look 
like? Will private monetary systems, like cryptocurrencies or Facebook’s Libra, be 
allowed or be a part of the mix? Or will a sovereign digital currency eventually 
emerge? These are global questions, which sit behind increasing geopolitical tensions; 
from sanctions avoidance as we saw with WannaCry and North Korea, to the 
possibility of a US-China currency war. The world is in a period of monetary history 
and transition. It is digital. It is global. And it brings in to question how the world 
currently operates, on a system of fiat money. The financial crisis served as the fire 
from which Bitcoin emerged, and raised with it wider questions of government-
controlled finances. Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, if nothing else, add to the multitude 
of payment options that now exist in the world. Whilst it is highly doubtful that they 
will replace any of the dominant sovereign currencies anytime soon, they could yet 
play a role in money, even if only a small one. The risks that they pose, both now and 
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